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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kirk Julliard Gosch appeals from his judgment of conviction for manufacturing a 
controlled substance (marijuana), possession of a controlled substance with the intent 
to deliver (marijuana), and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces. 
Mr. Gosch was convicted following a jury trial and district court imposed unified 
sentences of five years, with two years fixed, and placed Mr. Gosch on probation. 
Mr. Gosch now appeals, and he asserts that the district court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Following the execution of a search warrant at a residence in Hayden, Idaho, 
Mr. Gosch was charged with trafficking in cocaine, manufacturing a controlled 
substance (marijuana), possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver 
(marijuana), and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces. (R., pp.57 -58.) 
Mr. Gosch filed a motion to suppress. (R., p.67.) The following facts were found 
by the district court after an evidentiary hearing on the motion: On December 2, 2004, 
Mr. Gosch was stopped in his vehicle by Hayden City police officers and cited for 
possession of marijuana and paraphernalia. (R., p.154.) His criminal history included a 
prior arrest in October, 2003, for possession of paraphernalia. (R., p.154.) This 
information was communicated to the Idaho State Police, who had reports dating back 
approximately two years of Mr. Gosch's involvement in marijuana smuggling between 
Canada and Kootenai County. (R., pp.154-55.) 
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In late December, 2004, the ISP conducted a garbage pull at Mr. Gosch's 
residence, where officers found several plastic baggies with corners cut of, as well as 
some baggies with a white powdery substance in them. (R., p.155.) On January 6, 
2005, the ISP again conducted another garbage pull, finding heat-sealed plastic bags, 
some bearing labels which were markings used to denote grades of marijuana from 
Canada. (R., p.155.) Officers also found plant stems which tested positive for 
marijuana, several large butane gas cylinders, and two broken glass jars which tested 
positive for THC. (R., p.155.) Finally, they found several zip lock baggies which 
contained a green leafy substance and from which emanated a strong odor of 
marijuana. (R., p.155.) 
As a result, Detective Terry Morgan applied for and received a search warrant for 
Mr. Gosch's residence at 11974 N. Rimrock Road and for a black 1996 Jeep registered 
to Mr. Gosch. (R., p.155.) Prior to the execution of the search warrant, Detective 
Carlock observed Mr. Gosch and two other individuals carrying items from the 
residence to an area where two vehicles were parked. (R., p.155.) The Detective 
testified that she observed items being placed in both the black Jeep and a white 
Suzuki. (R., pp.155-56.) 
Kootenai County Police Deputy Shaw assisted in the execution of the warrant. 
(R., p.162.) While on the premises, Deputy Shaw walked his drug dog around the 
Suzuki, which alerted on the vehicle. (R., p.162.) Cocaine and marijuana were 
subsequently found in the trunk of the Suzuki. (R., p.156.) In the house, officers found 
several devices used for the ingestion of marijuana and several glass vials which 
contained suspected "honey oil," a refined marijuana substance. (R., p.156.) Officers 
also seized from the house multiple empty glass vials, packaging materials, a bottle of 
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MSM (commonly used as a cutting/bulking additive for cocaine distribution), and scales. 
(R., p.156.) 
Mr. Gosch filed a motion to suppress, asserting that some of the information in 
support of the search warrant was stale and that the search of the Suzuki was illegal 
because it was not covered by the search warrant. (R., p.132.)1 The State asserted 
that the search of the Suzuki was valid pursuant to the automobile exception and that 
the evidence found in the Suzuki would inevitably have been discovered. (R., pp.84, 
88.) 
The district court held that the search was valid pursuant to the automobile 
exception. (R., p.159.) The court held that the Suzuki was "readily mobile" and that the 
drug dog alert provided probable cause for the search. (R., p.161.) 
Mr. Gosch subsequently took his case to trial, where he was acquitted of 
trafficking in cocaine but found guilty of the marijuana-related offenses. (R., p.266.) 
The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of five years, with two years 
fixed, and suspended the sentences.2 (R., p.314.) Initially, counsel for Mr. Gosch failed 
to file an appeal from his judgment of conviction, but Mr. Gosch received his appel/ate 
rights back through post-conviction proceeding. See Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71 
(Ct. App. 2012). Mr. Gosch now appeals. (R., p.355.) He asserts that the district court 
erred by denying his motion to suppress. 
1 The district court held that, because counsel for Mr. Gosch failed to provide the court 
with a transcript of the search warrant hearing and did not cite with specificity the facts 
relied upon by the magistrate that were stale, Mr. Gosch had failed to meet his burden 
that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. (R., p.158.) Mr. Gosch does not 
challenge this holding on appeal. 
2 Mr. Gosch has satisfied his sentences, making any sentencing claims moot. 
3 ... 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Gosch's motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Gosch's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Gosch asserts that because the State failed to prove that the white Suzuki 
parked at his residence was "readily mobile," the State failed to prove that the 
automobile exception applied. He therefore asserts that the district court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact 
that are supported by substantial evidence but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 
(Ct. App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102,106 (1995). 
C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Gosch's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: ''The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 
516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against 
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unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CaNST. Art. I, § 17; State v. Donato, 135 
Idaho 469, 471 (2001). 
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth 
Amendment unless the State demonstrates that one of the we"-established and well-
delineated exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts. Id. at 390-91; 
see a/so State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard 
applies to Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution). 
One of those exceptions is the automobile exception, which allows officers to 
search the vehicle and containers therein if they have probable cause that contraband is 
inside. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982); State v. Gal/egos, 120 
Idaho 894, 898 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has stated, "[o]ur first cases 
establishing the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement 
were based on the automobile's 'ready mobility,' an exigency sufficient to excuse failure 
to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear." 
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 
386, 390-391 (1985); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925». "More recent 
cases provide a further justification: the individual's reduced expectation of privacy in an 
automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation." Id. Thus, the standard for the 
automobile exception is: "[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe 
it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle 
without more." Id. In Carney, the Supreme Court explained, "when a vehicle is being 
used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a 
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place not regularly used for residential purposes - temporary or otherwise the two 
justifications for the vehicle come into play." Carney, 1 U.S. at 392-93. 
Parked cars may be searched so long as they pass this test they are readily 
mobile and there is probable cause to believe they contain contraband. See /d. In 
Labron, the United States Supreme Court reversed two cases from Pennsylvania 
involving the searches of parked cars. /d. at 939. In the first case, "police observed 
respondent Labron and others engaging in a series of drug transactions on a street in 
Philadelphia. The police arrested the suspects, searched the trunk of a car from which 
the drugs had been produced, and found bags containing cocaine." Id. In the second 
case, 
an undercover informant agreed to buy drugs from respondent Randy Lee 
Kilgore's accomplice, Kelly Jo Kilgore. To obtain the drugs, Kelly Jo drove 
from the parking lot where the deal was made to a farmhouse where she 
met with Randy Kilgore and obtained the drugs. After the drugs were 
delivered and the Kilgores were arrested, police searched the farmhouse 
with the consent of its owner and also searched Randy Kilgore's pickup 
truck; they had seen the Kilgores walking to and from the truck, which was 
parked in the driveway of the farmhouse. 
/d. The Supreme Court held that the automobile exception applied to both of these 
situations. /d. at 940. In these cases, the vehicles were readily mobile - in the first 
case, the vehicle was parked on a city street, a temporary location. See id. In the 
second case, after the drug deal was made in the parking lot, both Randy Lee Kilgore 
drove to the farmhouse to complete the transaction; therefore, Randy Kilgore's vehicle 
was readily mobile. See id. 
In this case, the district court held that the Suzuki was readily mobile and relied 
on three cases: United States v. Hatley, 15 F .3d 856 (9th Cir. 1994), United States v. 
Markham, 844 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1988), and State v. Botte/son, 102 Idaho 90 (1981). 
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In Hatley, the Ninth Circuit held that the vehicle at issue, not actually 
mobile, it was apparently mobile. There was nothing apparent to the officers to suggest 
the car was immobile. It was not up on blocks, and there is no information in the record 
to indicate the tires were flat or that wheels of the car were missing." Hatley, 15 F.3d at 
859. Mr. Gosch asserts that this analysis should be rejected because it places the 
burden on the defendant to show that a car is immobile, when the burden of 
establishing an exception to the warrant requirement is always on the State. Just as the 
State must demonstrate probable cause, it must also demonstrate that a vehicle is 
readily mobile. 
In Markham, the appellant asserted that a warrant could have been obtained 
while the vehicle was unattended and under surveillance, and therefore, there were no 
exigent circumstances related to vehicle's mobility. Markham, 844 F.2d at 368. The 
Sixth Circuit rejected this, holding that ready mobility was not the only basis for the 
automobile exception. Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that its case presented a "variation 
on Camey because the vehicle searched was parked in a private driveway" but held 
that the search was valid pursuant to Carney. Id. Mr. Gosch submits that that this 
rationale should be rejected, as Carney specifically identified the situations that give rise 
to the exception: "When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily 
capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for 
residential purposes - temporary or otherwise - the two justifications for the vehicle 
exception come into play." Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93. Thus, the automobile 
exception applies in two scenarios: 1) a traffic stop, where the automobile exception 
most often arises; and 2) when the vehicle is readily capable of such use and is found 
stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes. In this case, 
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Mr. Gosch's vehicle was at the residence, and thus was not in a place "not regularly 
used for residential purposes." 
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Botte/son is not contrary to this 
proposition. In Bottelson, the third case relied on by the district court in this case, 
officers drove by the farmhouse of Jeff and Bonnie Rice, who were friends of one of the 
officers. Batte/son, 102 Idaho at 91. Id. The officer knew that his friends would 
normally not be at home at the time of day that he drove by. Id. The officer saw a 
vehicle that did not belong to the Rices in the driveway; the trunk was open and the 
defendant was standing at the rear of the automobile. Id. The defendant shut the trunk 
when he saw officers approach. Id. One officer observed a window missing from the 
Rices' residence, and the other officer observed that a door leading from the front porch 
into the house was standing open. Id. The defendant was then directed to open the 
trunk the vehicle; he complied, and various items belonging to the Rices were found in 
the vehicle. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the defendant, who presented no evidence at 
the suppression hearing, failed to establish an expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Id. 
at 92. However, even assuming that the defendant could have made such a showing, 
the court held that the search was valid. Id. The Court correctly noted that the 
automobile exception "rests not only on the mobility rationale, but also on," the reduced 
expectation of privacy. Id. at 93. The Court concluded: 
As measured by the constitutional standards reflected in the cases cited 
above, we think that the officers in the case at bar were justified under the 
fourth amendment in searching the trunk of the Pontiac without first 
obtaining a warrant. There was abundant probable cause that the 
automobile contained evidence of a crime. The foreign automobile backed 
up to the house with its trunk open, the removed window pane, the 
opened porch door, the defendant's closing of the trunk door when the 
officers arrived, the suspicious automobile registration, and all the other 
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circumstances evident to the officers clearly made it highly probable that a 
burglary was being committed and that evidence of the crime was in the 
trunk of the Pontiac. 
ld. at 93. The Court therefore held that the search was valid. Id. Botte/son, however, 
does not control the outcome of this case. The Botte/son Court never addressed the 
issue of whether the vehicle was "readily mobile," and for good reason. The probable 
cause to search the vehicle was evidence indicating that a burglary was in progress and 
that the vehicle was being used to perpetrate that burglary. The only conclusion that 
can be drawn from the facts in Botte/son was that the defendant drove the vehicle to the 
residence, took items belonging to the Rices, and was going to use the vehicle to leave. 
Thus, the mobility of the vehicle, which did not belong to the owners of the residence 
and therefore would not normally be parked there, was never in dispute. 
In the instant case, the district court stated, 
In the present case, Defendant contends that since the Suzuki "was not 
about to be moved" and was "secure where it was," the mobility concerns 
that justify the automobile exception were not present when the Suzuki 
was searched without a warrant. This assertion is simply not supported by 
existing case law. The distinction between -vehicles that may be searched 
without a warrant and those that may not is not made based on whether or 
not the subject vehicle is "secure" or "not about to be moved." Rather, the 
distinction primarily rests on the ability of the subject vehicle to be readily 
moved to another location. Here, the Suzuki was located in a driveway in 
close proximity to Defendant's residence. There was no testimony that it 
was mounted on blocks, had flat tires or was otherwise inoperable. Cf. 
Hatley, at 859. Contrary to Defendant's argument, the actions of the 
Defendant on the day of the search indicate that he was using, or was 
about to use, both the Suzuki and the Jeep to transport belongings from 
his residence to another location, which in and of itself indicates that the 
Suzuki was capable of being moved in the manner contemplated by the 
automobile exception. The fact that the Suzuki was parked in a residential 
driveway and without an operator when the warrantless search 
commenced does not place the Suzuki outside of the automobile 
exception. 
(R., p.161.) Mr. Gosch does not disagree with the district court that the fact the Suzuki 
was not about to be moved means that a vehicle is not readily mobile. If that were the 
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case, the defendants in Labron would have prevailed because the vehicle searches in 
those cases were made after the defendants had been arrested and thus there was no 
danger that the vehicle would be moved by them. See Labron, 518 U.S. at 939. 
However, the burden is still on the State to prove both ready mobility and probable 
cause. And there is simply no evidence that the Suzuki was mobile. As the district 
court noted, it was stationary in a residential driveway. And as is set forth above, 
"When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it readily capable of such use 
and is found stationary in a place not regularly used residential purposes -
temporary or otherwise the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play." 
Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93 (emphasis added). Mr. Gosch's vehicle was not being used 
on the highway and it was found stationary at a residence. The two justifications for the 
exception are not in play here. No officer testified to ever seeing the vehicle move (and 
the district court found no facts indicating that it had been recently moved.) Finally, 
simply placing property in a vehicle is insufficient to demonstrate that the vehicle is 
readily mobile, especially when a car is parked at a residence - the trunk of a vehicle 
can be used for storage just as easily as for transport. 
As is set forth above, the standard for the automobile exception is: "[i]f a car is 
readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth 
Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more." Labron, 518 U.S. 
at 940. In a traffic stop scenario, this is non-issue because the vehicle will be moving 
prior to the stop. When the vehicle is stationary, however, the State must prove that it is 
readily mobile. When it is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential 
purposes, such a city street or a gas station, it is more reasonable to conclude that the 
vehicle is mobile because it had to be moved to get to that location. A residential 
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driveway, however, is very different, and that is why Carney emphasizes places not 
regularly used for residential purposes. term, "readily mobile," must mean 
something, and if it can mean a vehicle parked in a driveway where there is no evidence 
that it has been recently driven, the term means next to nothing, and the only concern is 
probable cause. Because the automobile exception requires both ready mobility and 
probable cause3, and because the State presented no evidence of ready mobility, the 
district court's order must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gosch requests that the district court's order denying his motion to suppress 
be reversed, that his convictions be vacated, and that this case be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 2014. 
JUSTIN . . FrrIS v 
Deput~'$!~)Appeliate Public Defender 
3 Mr. Gosch does not challenge the district court's holding that the State had probable 
cause once the drug dog alerted on the vehicle. An alert by a reliable, trained canine 
unit provides probable cause. Florida v. Harris, _ U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1059 
(2013). Mr. Gosch only challenges the mobility finding. 
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